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0Migration and trade union rights  
 
Thierry Baudassé




We study in this paper both theoretically and empirically the influence of trade union rights in 
origin countries on bilateral migration flows. Theoretically, we propose two complementary 
models. In the first model, trade union rights are supposed to increase the bargaining power of 
workers. We model these rights as a transfer from high-skilled workers to low-skilled 
workers, assuming that this latter category of workers will benefit more from freedom of 
association and collective bargaining. However, we do have to take into account the large 
extent of informal economy in lots of developing countries. If trade union rights are only 
enforced in the formal sector, workers from this sector will benefit from a wage premium. The 
most qualified will then be the first winners of an improvement of such rights if they are more 
employed in the formal sector. We then propose different alternative indexes measuring trade 
union rights. We find that, all things being equal, more trade union rights tend to be associated 
with less migration of low-skill and high-skilled workers. Effects are not significant for 
intermediate skill level. Lastly, we show that social tensions may have the opposite effect. If 
trade union rights are associated with more social instability, it may increase the level of 
migration. It emphasizes the importance of social dialogue.  
 
Résumé 
Nous étudions dans ce papier l’influence des droits syndicaux dans les pays d’origine sur les 
flux de migration bilatéraux, tant du point de vue théorique qu’empirique. Théoriquement, 
nous proposons deux modèles complémentaires. Dans le premier modèle, les libertés 
syndicales sont supposées améliorer le pouvoir de négociation des travailleurs. Nous 
modélisons cet effet comme un transfert des travailleurs qualifiés vers les travailleurs 
qualifiés, considérant que cette catégorie de travailleurs bénéficiera plus de la liberté 
d’association. Néanmoins, nous devons également prendre en compte la large place de 
l’économie informelle dans les pays en développement. Si les libertés syndicales sont 
seulement respectées dans le secteur formel, les salariés de ce secteur bénéficieront d’un 
salaire plus élevé. Si les qualifiés sont relativement plus employés dans ce secteur, ils 
bénéficieront plus d’une amélioration de ces droits. Nous proposons ensuite différents 
indicateurs mesurant la liberté syndicale. Nous trouvons que, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, 
une meilleure liberté syndicale est associée avec moins de migration des qualifiés et des non-
qualifiés. Les effets ne sont pas significatifs pour une éducation intermédiaire. Enfin, nous 
montrons que les tensions sociales peuvent avoir les effets opposés. Si les droits syndicaux 
sont associés à une plus grande instabilité sociale, ils peuvent augmenter le niveau de 
migration. Cela met en avant l’importance du dialogue social dans la mise en place de la 
liberté syndicale.  
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0I.  Introduction 
 
In 2006, 4 millions of permanent migrants entered OECD countries (OECD, 2008).  It 
represents an increase of 5% compared to the previous year. In average, immigrants counted 
for 12% of the whole population in OECD countries. Since 2000, the increase is very high in 
some countries: 66% in Ireland, 40% in Finland and 34% in Austria. Political debates on these 
issues are very sensitive and relatively new in some countries which were emigration 
countries and became immigration countries in the last years. On the other side, emigration 
represents a huge challenge for developing countries. In some countries, for example in 
Caribbean islands, more than 40% of the working force lives abroad (Defoort 2008). The 
problem is more accurate for educated workers with emigration rates over 70% (85% in 
Jamaica). Challenge is huge both for destination and origin countries. In immigration 
countries, the integration of migrants into local labor markets is a real concern. In source 
countries, governments may be concerned by brain drain and its consequences on general 
human capital accumulation.  
  
  Thus the understanding of migration determinants is a central point for decision 
makers. In particular, wages and labor market characteristics are of particular interest. 
Migration may be influenced by economic or social characteristics in source and destination 
countries. We may distinguish push  factors from pull factors. The conventional wisdom 
considers that migrants are attracted by generous social welfare, high wages or good working 
conditions. However, labor markets characteristics in source countries do not have to be 
neglected.  This paper addresses the influence of labor standards in origin countries on 
emigration rates.  
  More precisely, out of the four core labor standards
3 recognized by ILO (1998), 
freedom of association and collective bargaining rights potentially have one of the largest 
effects. We propose to see how working conditions in origin countries may influence the 
decision to migrate.  
 
    The economic literature on migration deals with two main questions. The first 
one is the determinants of labor migration. This tradition comes from Hicks (1932) who 
argued that the main determinant of migration is the difference of wages. Todaro (1969) and 
Harris and Todaro (1970) observed that even in the presence of urban unemployment, 
                                                 






































0migration is still an attractive option if the agents maximize their expected earnings.  Field 
(1975) and Gupta (1993) introduced an informal sector into this framework. The “new 
economics of migration” proposes new possible determinants of migration. For example, 
movement of workers can be a risk diversification strategy inside the household. According to 
this approach, income of migrants, which is not correlated with agricultural income, will 
reduce the risk for the household (Levhari and Stark, 1982; Lucas and Stark, 1985; Stark 
1991). Another useful hypothesis introduced by new economics of migration is that 
individuals are not migrating only in response of absolute income differential but also 
according to relative deprivations (Stark and Yitzhaki, 1988 ; Stark and Taylor, 1991 ; Stark 
1991).  
  The second main question is the consequences of migration. One major issue is the 
influence of workers migration on the labor market in destination countries (see for example 
Grossman, 1982; Borjas 1994, 1999; Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1997). Another important 
issue is the influence of migration on the accumulation of human capital in source countries. 
This concern began with Bhagwati and Dellafar (1973) and Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), 
who argued that migration may have negative consequences in developing countries because 
of the deprivation of their best-trained workers (phenomenon of brain drain). Nevertheless, 
more recent models (Beine et al. 2001, 2003; Mountford 1997; Stark et al. 1997) show brain 
drain may have positive consequences, through increased incentives to accumulate human 
capital in developing countries. Brain drain may become a brain gain. Finally, some authors 
have questioned the effects of migration on social capital in destination countries as well as in 
source countries (Schiff, 1999; 2002).  
 Interactions  between labor markets have been studied in many different ways but 
focused on two main specific aspects: the role of wages differential and the consequences of 
migration on labor markets in destination countries. So far, very few studies focus on the 
influence of labor market characteristics in source countries. In parallel, a controversial debate 
emerged concerning the development outcomes of labor standards. The empirical literature on 
this topic established the ambiguous links between labor standards and international trade 
(Brown 2000, Granger 2005), foreign direct investment (Kucera 2002), economic 
coordination (Aidt et Tzannatos 2002), productivity (Brown, Deardorff, et Stern 1996, 
Maskus 1997, OCDE 1996), long-term per capita income (Bazillier 2008) and income 
inequalities (Bazillier and Sirven 2008). Most of these outcomes may influence the 
determinants of emigration. Lastly, the extent of informal economy matters regarding the 





































0unions in the Harris-Todaro (1970) framework where the rural-urban migration depends on 
the wage-setting influenced by trade unions. Quibria (1988) introduced explicitly the informal 
urban sector in such framework. Harrison and Leamer (1997) showed that restrictive labor 
standards may induce a shift of a significant part of the working force from the formal to the 
informal sector. Singh and Zammit (2000) considered that freedom of association may 
increase the level of informality through the fall of formal employment and labor demand in 
this sector. Empirically, the influence of labor standards on informality is not clear. Marques 
and Pages (1998) found a high correlation while Kucera and Galli (2004) showed that 
countries with higher standards in Latin America tend also to have a higher share of formal 
employment.  
 
This paper proposes to study the influence of freedom of association and collective 
bargaining rights
4 on migration in source countries. The first contribution of this paper is the 
modeling of the possible effects of collective bargaining on emigration rates. Collective 
bargaining is alternatively modeled as (1) an income transfer from the high-skilled workers to 
the low-skilled and, (2) a premium for workers in the formal sector. The second contribution 
of the paper is the building of an original measurement of freedom of association and 
collective bargaining right, for a large panel of countries. The third contribution is the 
empirical analysis of such linkages. Globally, we find a negative impact of freedom of 
association on emigration rates for high-skilled workers and low-skilled workers.  
 
The paper is organized as follow. The second section proposes different theoretical 
modeling of the effects of collective bargaining on migration flows. The third section deals 
with the empirical measurement of freedom of association and collective bargaining rights. 
Fourth section deals with the econometric analysis of their effects on migration. A fifth 
section proposes a complementary analysis dealing with the influence of social tensions on 
migration. Finally, last section concludes.  
                                                 
4   Freedom of association and collective bargaining rights are considered as equivalent. The recognition of 
these rights is included in the same ILO conventions (87 and 98). Freedom of association, collective 
bargaining and trade union rights will be understood similarly. No distinctions will be made between the use 





































0II. Theoretical frameworks 
 
A.  Presentation of complementary models 
 
We may suppose that collective bargaining will induce an improvement of wages and 
working conditions for workers at the bottom of the pay scale
5. However, if this right is only 
respected in the formal sector, workers with the lowest productivity may not benefit from 
these collective rights if they are excluded from this sector
6. We will thus propose two 
complementary modeling of these effects. First, collective bargaining rights will be modeled 
as redistribution from high-skilled to low skilled workers. In order to raise wages of low 
skilled workers, firms will reduce the relative wages of the high-skilled workers in order to 
maintain their level of profit (otherwise, the capital will fly outside the country). A second 
option could be the following one: the improvement of working conditions in the formal 
sector will increase the size of the informal sector where these rights are not respected 
(Harrison et Leamer 1997). High-skilled workers will move to the formal sector which will 
employ workers with the highest productivity. Low-skilled workers will not benefit from this 
right and the winners will be high-skilled workers. 
 
We will then have two possible models: a model where collective bargaining is 
modeled as a transfer from high-skilled to low-skilled workers (model a) and a model where 
collective bargaining is a premium for workers in the formal sector, with no change in the 
informal sector (model b). Empirical analysis will be used to validate or refute each of them. 
 
B.  Collective bargaining as a transfer from high-skilled to low skilled workers 
 
We consider two countries S and N (respectively the South and the North). In each country, 
population is standardized to 1. There exist in these two countries two categories of workers: 
skilled (index q) and unskilled (index nq). The proportion of skilled workers in the north is α 
and in the South is β, it is supposed that α> β.  In the North the production function is:  
Y = A1 . Lq + A2. Lnq with A1 > A2              (1) 
 
                                                 
5  According to Saint Paul (2002), unskilled workers are often more unionized and benefit more from labor 
market institutions.   





































0And in the South it is : 
Y = B1. Lq + B2. Lnq with  B1 > B2          (2) 
 
We suppose that labor standards are perfectly respected in the North
7 and/or we are under 
perfect competition. Wages, w, are established as follow:  
 
w
q = A1             (3) 
w 
nq  = A2             (4) 
 
In the South, labor market is characterized by imperfect competition. Employers have a 
market power over unskilled workers. This market power is equivalent to redistribution from 
unskilled to skilled workers. We assume that the lack of freedom of association creates a 
situation of monopsony on the labor market (OECD 1996, 2000). The enforcement of labor 
standards will then compensate this distortion on the labor market. 
 
Skilled workers are in proportion β, so a dollar taken from an unskilled worker ends in (1-β)/β 
additional dollar for each skilled worker.  
 
 There are two different wages in the south: 
v
q = B1 + (1-β)/β . t1  
                                                
         (5) 
v
nq = B2 - t1             (6) 
t1 is the transfer from unskilled to skilled workers. It reflects the level of freedom of 
association enforced in the country. The closer to zero is the value of t1, the higher is the 
enforcement of such right. So, diminishing the value of  t1  gives us what we formerly call 
formally « model a ». 
 
Individuals in the South are characterized by a certain level of migration cost, depending on 
their educational level: ci (k) with k= (q, nq). This cost is supposed to depend on the 
psychological capacity to support distance with friends and family, the existence of migrants’ 
network abroad, the individual taste for mobility. Parameter ci in each category of workers is 
distributed according to a uniform distribution between 0 and one maximum value C*(k) with 
 
7  Of course, this is a strong asumption. However, as we focus on the influence of trade union rights in the 





































0k= (q, nq).  
Individuals decide to migrate when:  
wk  ≥  vk + ci, that is when wk -  vk ≥   ci .  
They migrate when the cost of migration is lower than wage differential between north and 
south. For a given value of the parameters, there will exist a proportion of the population of 







k -  v
k C* 






By decreasing t1 one decreases vq and thus one increases wq -  vq and (wq -  vq)] / C* (q). In 
other words one increases the proportion of skilled workers who wish to migrate. On the 
other hand, one increases vnq and thus one decrease the proportion of unskilled who want 
to migrate. 
 
Proposition 1: if collective bargaining rights are respected in all sectors and if wages only 
depend on skill levels, the enforcement of such rights will increase the number of skilled 
migrants and will lower the number of unskilled migrants.  
 
The proportion of each population wishing to migrate is then defined by the following table: 
Qualified Not-qualified 
F / C*(q) with  F= A1 – B1 - (1-β)/β . t1  G / C* (nq) with G = A2 - B2 + t1 
 
 
Notice that an alternative model would be the following. In absence of collective bargaining,  
unskilled workers are paid below their productivity (v





































0paid at the level of their marginal productivity (without wage premium as stated before). 
Here, the transfer t1 would be a rent for owners of firms. In this alternative model, collective 
bargaining leads to a decrease in the number of unskilled migrants inasmuch as their income 
is higher than in absence of trade union rights. However, number of skilled migrants would 
remain unchanged. 
 
Proposition 1bis: In a model similar to the one of Proposition 1, when there is no wage 
premium for the skilled in absence of collective bargaining rights, the enforcement of such 
rights will lower the number of unskilled migrants but will remain the number of skilled 
migrants unchanged.  
 
  B. Collective bargaining as a premium for the formal sector (model b) 
 
We now have two sectors: the informal and the formal sectors. Each worker is characterized 
by a level of qualification qi. These levels qi are distributed according to a uniform 
distribution between 0 and a maximum value Q. Formal sector attracts skilled workers 
because of better wages and working conditions. Firms from the formal sector can choose the 
most productive workers and then hire the most qualified. Other workers work in the informal 
sector. In order to simplify, we assume that wages in the formal sector are equal to the sum of 
a minimum institutional real wage w and a premium which depends on the qualification of the 
employee: w(qi) = w+p(qi), with p(0)=0 and p’(qi)>0. The result of collective bargaining is a 
rise of the minimum wage w. We also assume that the formal sector produces an 
internationally tradable good which price is determined by the international price. Income in 
the informal sector is supposed to be equal to s<w. We assume that informal sector produces a 
service. The economy is then composed by two goods: the tradable good produced by the 
formal sector and the service produced by the informal one.  
 
When w raises all wages in formal sector raise and consequently the marginal cost of the good 
raises for a given produced quantity. Maximization of profit implies that the price of the good 
(internationally fixed) is equal to the marginal cost so, in order to maximize profit, the formal 
sector will shrink its production and employment. So, we have: 





































0A rise in w will then imply a fall in formal employment Lf . The formal sector will then select 
more strictly its employees, hiring the individuals with a level of qualification higher than qi*, 
in order to have: 
Lf / L = (Q – qi*)/ Q, with L the total employment, equal to the total population which is 
constant. By hypothesis, there is no unemployment, the informal sector being able to hire the 

















Obviously, when Lf decreases, the minimum level of qualification qi* needed to be hired in 
the formal sector rises. The increase of the minimum wage w, which is here a consequence of 
collective bargaining, induces a higher selectivity in the formal sector. In summary, in this 
framework, only skilled workers will benefit from this labor standard. It can possibly have 
negative consequences for unskilled workers if they are fired from the formal sector. 
Collective bargaining will then increase the income of all skilled workers and it may decrease 
the income of some unskilled. This will lead to less migration among skilled workers and it 
may lead to more migration among the unskilled.  
 
Proposition 2: if collective bargaining rights are only enforced in the formal sector and if 
the wages depend crucially on the sector of employment, the enforcement of such rights will 
lower the migration of skilled workers and possibly increase the migration of the unskilled. 
 
III. Measurement of trade union rights 
Different measures exist in order to estimate a level of freedom of association. These indexes 
can be classified into two main categories: legal or outcome indexes. 
 





































0of indexes is that it gives no information about the effectiveness of these rights. Even if 
freedom of association is a constitutional right, there is no guarantee that this right is enforced 
in practice. On the other side, a country without legal protection may face large activities of 
trade unions or collective bargaining. In this category of indexes, we have Botero et al. (2004) 
indexes on labor union power and collective bargaining.  
 
Outcome indexes are based on the consequences of freedom of association on the 
number or proportion of workers that belong to an organization related to labor issues (Ghai 
2003). “In general, the higher the union density is, the stronger the defense of workers 
interests in negotiations with employers and the government, and the greater the participation 
by workers in matters affecting their work”. However, there are different problems. 
Unionization rate is also based on historical traditions or political systems (Jose, 2002). Ghai 
(2003) also argues it is a problem for developing countries because of the small size of the 
labor force in the formal economy.   Moreover, a high unionization rate does not reflect 
necessarily a good level of freedom of association if the membership to a trade union is 
compulsory, strongly recommended, or needed to get access to some jobs. Activities of trade 
unions can be strong where unionization rate is low (like in France). We will then take into 
consideration other outcome variables such as the number of strikes or proportion of workers 
involved. Lastly, the number of strikes reflects both trade unions activities but also the level of 
social tensions in the country.  
 
Here, we choose to aggregate different categories of indexes measuring both legal 
protections and effective enforcement of trade union rights. Our first index index_TU 
aggregates the number of strikes per year, the number of workers involved in trade unions 
activities (in % of the working force), the index civil rights, from Freedom House measuring 
among other things the effective level of trade union rights, and an index proposed by Botero 
et al. (2004), index_col_barg13, which measures the statutory protection and power of union
8. 
In a first time, we do not propose to include the unionization rate into this index because of 
the limited number of countries where this information is available. We will however present 
in a second time different alternative indexes to check the robustness of our results.   The 
                                                 
8    It measures the statutory protection and power of unions as the average of the following seven dummy 
variables which equal one: (1) if employees have the right to unionize; (2) if employees have the right to 
collective bargaining; (3) if employees have the legal duty to bargain with unions; (4) if collective contracts 
are extended to third parties by law; (5) if the law allows closed shops; (6) if workers, or unions, or both have 





































0index is obtained using principal component analysis (PCA), which goal is to isolate common 
factors between different variables (here the effective trade union rights), by reducing total 
information in order to get an easier economic description of the variables. Table 1 gives the 
results of this PCA.  
 
Table 1: PCA results for index_TU 
Component    Eigenvalue   Difference     Proportion  Cumulative
Factor 1   1.31421 0.329148 0.3286 0.3286
Factor 2 0.985065 0.0481961 0.2463 0.5748
Factor 3 0.936869 0.173017 0.2342 0.8090
Factor 4 0.763853        . 0.1910 1
 
A criterion frequently chosen to decide how many factors to retain is the Kaiser 
criteria. According to this criterion, if a factor explains more than the original variable, it is 
necessary to extract it. As the sum of eigenvalues of p variables is equal to p, we only retain 
factors which have an eigenvalue higher than 1. According to this criterion, only the first 
factor would be sufficient to get a satisfactory description of the data. However, we could 
notice that the second and the third factor has also a significant explicative power and an 
eigenvalue very close to one. This result reinforces the idea that trade union rights are a very 
complex phenomenon, difficult to measure and to describe. Our explanation is that one single 
information (for example a high proportion of workers involved) may reflect two things. First, 
it may mean that trade union rights are well-respected. But it can also mean that the level of 
social dialogue is weak and workers do have to use a power struggle to obtain by 
demonstrating what they would have obtained through negotiations. It may also mention 
social tensions in the country. This ambivalent nature of trade union rights outcome variables 
cannot be avoided. The task to obtain a good proxy of trade union rights is thus difficult. We 
will take into account this difficulty in our empirical strategy.  
However, the observation of the variables coordinates on the different axis may help 
us to distinguish these different aspects (Table 2). As we can see, the coordinates on the first 
factor may be interpreted as a proxy of trade union rights and the intensity of trade unions 
activities. The number of strikes, of workers involved influences positively the coordinates on 
this factor. The civil rights index has the opposite influence (a high value of this index reflects 
a weak enforcement of these rights) while the index of Botero et al. (2004) has the opposite 
effects (more collective bargaining rights induce a positive coordinates on the first axis). We 





































0It is difficult to give a meaning to the second factor because of contradictory 
information. If workers involved in trade unions activities have a negative influence on its 
coordinate on this axis, the number of strikes has the opposite effect. We have the same 
contradiction with the two other indexes which have both positive coordinates while the 
meaning is the opposite. We will thus do not exploit this index.  
However, the third axis gives interesting intuitions. Here, workers involved, strikes 
and low civil rights have a positive influence on the coordinates while the level of collective 
bargaining rights has a negative influence. We will thus interpret this axis as a proxy of 
“social tensions” for positive coordinates on this axis and “social dialogue” for negative 
coordinates. Countries may have very low number of strikes and workers involved if social 
dialogue is strong and trade union rights respected. At the contrary, numerous strikes or 
workers involved may be interpreted as a signal of social tensions. As we can see in table 1, 
the contribution of this axis is very closed to the one of the second axis (0.23 against 0.24). 
We call index_TU_4 this index. 
 By interpreting factor 1 and 3, we use more than 55% of the information included in 
the variables.  
  
Table 2: Coordinates of variables on main factors 
Variable
0.5676 -0.1553 0.5561 0.5869
-0.4619 0.7205 0.1502 0.4950
0.4975 0.6384 0.2374 -0.5371
0.4658 0.2217 -0.7822 0.3493
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
workers involved
Civil Rights Freedom House
Strikes
index_col_barg13 (Botero et al. 2004)
 
Because of the difficulty to measure effectively the level of trade union rights, we 
propose to use in the empirical sections different alternative indexes. Two of them are 
constructed with the same methodology as index_TU. The three others are proposed by other 
authors (Botero et al 2004 , Kucera 2004, CEPII 2001). 
 
The index index_TU_2 aggregates the unionization rate, the number of strikes per 
year, the number of workers involved in trade unions activities (in % of the working force), 
and the index civil rights, from Freedom House. We do not include index_col_barg13 in order 
to have only variables measuring the outcome of trade union rights and not legal indexes.   As 
stated before, the main limit of this index is the limited number of countries for which we can 





































0the results of PCA.  
 
Table 3: PCA results for index_TU_2 
Component    Eigenvalue   Difference     Proportion  Cumulative
Factor 1   1.76356  .622041      0.4409   0.4409
Factor 2   1.14151  .491461      0.2854   0.7263
Factor 3   .650054  .205177      0.1625   0.8888
Factor 4   .444876        .      0.1112 1
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
TU_rate     0.5406    -0.3376    0.6636
workers involved   0.6162   0.2767  0.0719
Civil Rights Freedom House -0.5327     0.3108     0.7439
Strikes     0.2103     0.8443   -0.0321
 
As for index_TU, the first axis would reflect the general level of trade union rights while the 
second axis will be interpreted as a proxy of social tensions in the country.  
 
  We then propose to build a third index without the unionization rate (to include more 
countries) and without index_col_barg13 (in order to have an outcome index). Table 4 gives 
the result for this index index_TU_3.  
 
Table 4: Results of PCA (index_TU_3) 
Component    Eigenvalue   Difference     Proportion Cumulative
Factor 1   1.18537  .159728      0.3951  0.3951
Factor 2   1.02564  .236653      0.3419  0.7370
Factor 3   .788989        .      0.2630 36526
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2
workers involved  0.7295  -0.0141
Civil Rights Freedom House -0.4490    0.7443
Strikes    0.5159     0.6677
 
  The fourth index is the one created by Botero et al. 2004, index_col_barg13, which 
measures the statutory protection and power of unions. This index is clearly a legal index 
measuring only the legal protection of trade unions. It is included as a variable in the 
index_TU.  
 
The fifth index is proposed by CEPII (2001) from a database built by researchers from 





































0Development Agency (AFD), constructed from a world survey conducted with MINEIE and 
AFD agencies present in the countries covered in the database. The variable used, freedom of 
association, is coded from 0 to 4
9. 
 
And lastly, we will use the index proposed by Kucera (2004). His method is based on 
coding violations of these rights recorded in what are regarded as the three best existing 
textual sources on trade union rights (the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions’ 
(ICFTU) Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights, the United States State Department’s 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, and the ILO’s Report of the Committee on Freedom of 
Association).  
 
IV. Empirical analysis: trade union rights and migration 
 
A.  Empirical specification and data 
 
We want to measure the influence of freedom of association and collective bargaining on 
bilateral migration flows, by skill-level. We then propose to estimate the following model: 
 
     (7) 
where  is the migration rate (in percentage of the working force of the country i) in log, 
from country i to country j,  for workers with skill level e (respectively primary, secondary or 
tertiary).  is the level of collective bargaining in country i.  is a vector of control variables 
specific to the country i.  is a vector of control variables specific to the country j.   is a 
vector of bilateral control variables.  is the error term. We assume it to be i.i.d.. Standard 
errors are clustered at the origin-destination level and robust to heteroscedasticity. 
 
All estimations firstly use OLS estimators and standard errors are clustered at the origin-
destination- couple-level
10. However, we should take into account one important feature of 
our migration database which is the high proportion of zero for the dependant variable (26% 
in the total population database) that may lead to inconsistent estimates. The use of a log 
                                                 
9  0 if no rights guaranteeing freedom of association- if rights exist, from 1=weak rights, little freedom to 
4=strong rights, substantial freedom. 
10   We do not present however the results of OLS estimate. Results are relatively similar to the one using 
Heckman two-steps procedures. Moreover, the inverse Mills ratio is significant in most estimations, putting 





































0specification will drop all zero observations creating biaised estimates. This problem has often 
be ignored in the literature on migration while it is relatively common in the international 
trade literature (Linders and de Groot, 2006). Some recent papers on migration deals with the 
high proportion of zero and propose econometric strategies to correct this biais (Beine, 
Docquier, and Ozden, 2009; El Yaman, Kugler, and Rapoport, 2007). We thus propose to use 
Heckman (1979) two-step regressions providing consistent estimates in the case of selection 
bias. The first step is a probit estimate of the probability to have a positive migration flow 
(selection equation). Estimations using Heckman two steps strategy generally propose an 
additional instrument for this selection equation. However, as stressed by Wooldridge (2002), 
the use of an additional instrument in the selection equation is not strictly necessary. As it is 
very difficult to find a convincing instrument which may explain the decision to migrate but 




  Data on migration are from Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007) and are available 
for 1991 and 2001. Due to the small number of period, we do not include time or country 
fixed effects. 
 
 Control  variables  include the level of GDP per capita in origin and destination country. 
This variable can be interpreted in two ways. It may be a proxy of wages. It is also a proxy of 
migration costs. If income is too low, workers do not have the capacity to migrate. We also 
add the proportion of young people within the population considering this is the more mobile 
group (with less migratory costs). We take into account the level of democracy, measured by a 
combined polity score (Polity IV) proposed by Gleditsch (2003)
12 to capture migration costs 
linked to the political system. We also control for the population in origin and destination 
countries. We add bilateral variables such as the existence of common frontiers, distance 
between countries, the fact to have a common language, and the fact to have a past colonial 
past. All these variables are correlated with the existence of a network of migrants and then 
will influence the migratory costs. Finally, we also add regional dummies in order to capture 
                                                 
11  As noticed by Wooldridge (2002), the problem to not use an additional instrument is the high correlation 
between the Mills ratio and the other variables in the second equation. This will lead to a lower significance 
of the coefficients. 
12  See Gleditsch & Ward (1997) for a detailed presentation of the index. Basically, this is a combined index of 
several sub-dimension measuring different aspects of ‘authority’ (competitiveness of political participation, 
regulation of political participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive 





































0partially unobserved heterogeneity between countries. 
 
B.  Results 
 
Table 5 gives the result of the estimations using our first index of trade union rights 
(index_TU). We observe a significant and negative relation between trade union rights and 
emigration rates. This effect on the overall migration flows is explained by a significant 
impact on the emigration rate of primary educated workers and tertiary educated workers. Our 
two  models presented in the theoretical section of this paper are then validated conjointly by 
our estimates. Low-skilled workers may benefit from trade union rights through an increased 
bargaining power, higher wages and better working conditions. On the other side, high-skilled 
workers may also benefit from trade union rights because of a wage premium in the formal 
sector. Effects are not significant for secondary educated workers for whom one effect may be 
compensated by the other.  
 
Other control variables globally take the expected sign. The GDP per capita in origin 
countries has a negative influence on emigration rate, except for low-skilled workers where 
this variable is not significant. This can be explained by the existence of too high migration 
costs for this category of workers. Population in origin countries is negatively correlated with 
emigration rates while population in destination countries has a positive influence. Political 
factors seem to have a significant role: autocracy increases migration costs. However, this 
effect is not significant for skilled workers. Concerning bilateral variables, only the fact to 
have a former colonial relationship has a significant (and positive) impact on bilateral 
migration flows. However, we may suppose that the effect of other variables (such as the 
common language) is also captured by this variable.  
 
This first result is important. For different reasons, trade union rights may retain both low-
skilled and high-skilled workers. We should however be cautious at this stage in the 
interpretation of our results because of the difficulty to measure effectively trade union rights. 
That is why we propose to test, in a second time their robustness by using alternative indexes 







































Table 5: Heckman two-steps estimates of bilateral migration flows 
 
select select select select
index_TU -0.142*** 0.0425 -0.211*** 0.0309 -0.0504 0.0466 -0.216*** 0.0635*
(-3.417) (1.090) (-4.653) (0.821) (-1.209) (1.229) (-5.427) (1.647)
-0.122* 0.104* 0.0903 0.107* -0.214*** 0.101* -0.400*** 0.121**
(-1.852) (1.802) (1.233) (1.908) (-3.227) (1.797) (-6.272) (2.123)
2.659*** 1.403*** 2.404*** 1.581*** 2.220*** 1.458*** 3.013*** 1.448***
(10.61) (18.45) (7.428) (20.76) (7.921) (19.42) (11.38) (19.11)
-0.432*** 0.224*** -0.421*** 0.245*** -0.496*** 0.247*** -0.379*** 0.223***
(-9.857) (7.727) (-7.991) (8.691) (-10.20) (8.707) (-8.672) (7.851)
1.099*** -0.0475** 1.023*** 0.0512** 0.938*** 0.00134 1.114*** -0.00912
(46.78) (-2.054) (36.83) (2.371) (39.74) (0.0616) (50.22) (-0.411)
0.00211 -0.108*** -0.0236 -0.110*** -0.168*** -0.0851*** -0.0499 -0.102***
(0.0629) (-4.553) (-0.623) (-4.759) (-5.168) (-3.672) (-1.546) (-4.358)
0.550*** 0.0281 0.568*** 0.0742 -0.388*** 0.0987 0.479*** 0.0452
(5.156) (0.321) (4.731) (0.872) (-3.583) (1.153) (4.665) (0.525)
0.0472*** -0.000222 0.0654*** 6.85e-05 0.0394*** 0.000698 0.00550 -0.00288
(4.103) (-0.0216) (5.121) (0.00693) (3.421) (0.0696) (0.503) (-0.285)
0.509*** 0.150 0.610*** 0.138 0.476*** 0.101 0.237 0.141
(3.284) (1.014) (3.585) (0.964) (3.078) (0.713) (1.613) (0.972)
0.160 -0.0463 -0.119 -0.00732 0.176 0.0483 0.0160 -0.0210
(0.558) (-0.179) (-0.384) (-0.0284) (0.621) (0.188) (0.0594) (-0.0814)
-0.0695 -0.0379 0.0410 0.00384 -0.138 -0.0417 0.119 -0.0185
(-0.552) (-0.376) (0.294) (0.0389) (-1.087) (-0.424) (0.992) (-0.185)
-4.91e-06 -5.50e-06 -1.89e-05 -1.05e-05 1.51e-06 -5.14e-06 4.73e-06 -6.20e-06
(-0.462) (-0.591) (-1.608) (-1.174) (0.142) (-0.572) (0.468) (-0.679)
0.265** -0.0977 0.287** -0.0415 0.241* -0.0646 -0.000968 -0.0850
(2.034) (-0.821) (1.997) (-0.361) (1.848) (-0.558) (-0.00780) (-0.729)
0.470*** -0.213 0.494*** -0.238* 0.398** -0.126 0.975*** -0.207
(2.820) (-1.520) (2.623) (-1.752) (2.409) (-0.915) (6.086) (-1.500)
0.205 0.414* 0.432 0.313 0.199 0.181 -0.0668 0.330
(0.853) (1.828) (1.643) (1.490) (0.836) (0.873) (-0.295) (1.516)
1.492*** 0.0304 1.194*** 0.106 1.747*** 0.0530 1.608*** 0.0260
(8.986) (0.198) (6.508) (0.716) (10.51) (0.357) (10.19) (0.173)
lambda -1.031** -1.008* -0.991** 0.0774
(-2.160) (-1.909) (-1.999) (0.159)
Constant -48.53*** -16.82*** -47.30*** -20.92*** -35.82*** -18.93*** -49.32*** -18.14***
(-14.49) (-14.34) (-10.42) (-17.79) (-9.153) (-16.32) (-13.63) (-15.56)
Observations 2856 2856 2856 2856 2856 2856 2856 2856
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

















Note: The dependent variables are the logarithm of migration rates (in percentage of the source country total working force).
 
C.  Robustness checks of the results: alternative indexes of trade union rights 
 
We only present the estimated coefficient of different trade union rights indexes. Estimated 
coefficients of control variables are globally similar with the results presented in table 5.  
Both legal indexes and outcome indexes confirm the previous result: trade union rights has a 
negative impact on bilateral migration flows both for primary educated workers and tertiary 
educated workers. The only difference is the result obtained with the index of trade union 





































0rights would increase the migration rate, both for primary and tertiary educated workers. We 
will see in the next section that this result can be explained by the heterogeneous 
consequences of trade union rights.  
select select select select
index_TU_2 -0.106* 0.0170 -0.0601 -0.0138 -0.104 0.0290 -0.179*** 0.0282
(-1.649) (0.312) (-0.872) (-0.265) (-1.582) (0.553) (-3.088) (0.525)
Observations 1341 1341 1341 1341 1341 1341 1341 1341
index_TU_3 -0.0437 0.0625** -0.0816** 0.0646** 0.0186 0.0700** -0.0327 0.0621**
(-1.231) (2.066) (-2.088) (2.201) (0.519) (2.370) (-0.878) (2.084)
Observations 3623 3623 3623 3623 3623 3623 3623 3623
-0.341* 0.0349 -0.555*** -0.00172 -0.112 -0.00780 -1.182*** 0.0308
(-1.802) (0.198) (-2.735) (-0.00999) (-0.602) (-0.0455) (-6.538) (0.178)
Observations 3445 3445 3445 3445 3445 3445 3445 3445
CEPII & Maastricht (2001) -0.197*** -0.0615 -0.337*** -0.0497 -0.134*** -0.0552 -0.0928* -0.0361
(-4.045) (-1.274) (-6.301) (-1.065) (-2.692) (-1.196) (-1.911) (-0.776)
Observations 2046 2046 2046 2046 2046 2046 2046 2046
0.00931 0.00517 0.0336** 0.0106 0.0141 0.00593 0.0449*** 0.00752
(0.708) (0.541) (2.242) (1.118) (1.022) (0.632) (3.037) (0.796)
Observations 5241 5241 5241 5241 5241 5241 5241 5241
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dep.Var. lnmig lnmig_prim lnmig_sec lnmig_ter
Botero et al. (2004)
Kucera (2004)
z-statistics in parentheses
Table 6: Heckman two steps estimates of bilateral migration flows  
 
V. Migration, social tensions and social dialogue 
 
As we saw in section III, outcome variables may reflect two things: (1) the level of trade 
union rights which we measure through our index index_TU, but also (2) the level of social 
tensions which is captured by the third factor of the PCA (index_TU_4). As we can see in 
figure 1, different profiles of countries can be detected.  
 
Countries such as Argentina or Bolivia for example are characterized by a high value of their 
coordinates on the first and second axis. This can be interpreted by a high level of social 
tensions. For relatively similar coordinates on the first axis, countries such as Sweden, 
Norway or Japan have a negative coordinates on the second axis. This is a characteristic of 
countries where level of social dialogue is high and thus, the number of strikes is limited. 
Until now, we only focused on trade union rights. But we can suppose that social tensions 
may have different effects. Violations of trade union rights measured by Kucera (2004) may 
also be linked to this level of social tensions. Violations of these rights are of course 
negatively correlated with their respect. But it may also be positively correlated with the 
general level of social tensions in the country. We then propose to measure the influence of 
this aspect in the migration decision, by estimating conjointly the effect of trade union rights 








































Figure 1: PCA analysis of trade union rights and social tensions 
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-2 0 2 4
index_TU (freedom of association)
index_TU is the first axis of the PCA. Index_TU_4 is the third one. Labels marked are for year 2001.
PCA analysis of trade unions rights
Freedom of association - social dialogue - social tensions
Note: The PCA analysis includes as variables: the number of strikes per year, the number of workers involved 
in trade unions activities (in % of the working force), the index civil rights (Freedom House), and the index 
of Botero et al. (2004). 
 
Table 7: Heckman two steps estimates of bilateral migration flows – trade union rights 
and social tensions 
Dep.Var. lnmig select lnmig_prim select lnmig_sec select lnmig_ter select
index_TU -0.146*** 0.0405 -0.212*** 0.0281 -0.0512 0.0435 -0.238*** 0.0612
(-3.497) (1.027) (-4.657) (0.735) (-1.226) (1.133) (-5.970) (1.568)
index_TU_4 0.0356 0.0147 0.0112 0.0195 0.0122 0.0228 0.177*** 0.0184
(0.872) (0.387) (0.249) (0.528) (0.298) (0.617) (4.592) (0.492)
Observations 2856 2856 2856 2856 2856 2856 2856 2856
index_TU -0.154*** 0.0386 -0.244*** 0.0283 -0.0641 0.0428 -0.210*** 0.0558
(-3.650) (0.976) (-5.275) (0.743) (-1.510) (1.115) (-5.257) (1.424)
kucera 0.0365* 0.00594 0.0843*** 0.00481 0.0330 0.0153 0.0211 0.0144
(1.810) (0.323) (3.785) (0.270) (1.622) (0.857) (1.108) (0.805)
Observations 2797 2797 2797 2797 2797 2797 2797 2797
index_TU -0.159*** 0.0359 -0.247*** 0.0248 -0.0657 0.0385 -0.234*** 0.0521
(-3.749) (0.893) (-5.303) (0.639) (-1.541) (0.985) (-5.864) (1.310)
index_TU_4 0.0402 0.0175 0.0232 0.0214 0.0162 0.0277 0.176*** 0.0248
(0.985) (0.457) (0.518) (0.575) (0.396) (0.740) (4.608) (0.656)
kucera 0.0380* 0.00718 0.0852*** 0.00626 0.0337* 0.0173 0.0272 0.0162
(1.879) (0.385) (3.816) (0.347) (1.654) (0.953) (1.433) (0.890)
Observations 2797 2797 2797 2797 2797 2797 2797 2797
z-statistics in parentheses







































The results confirm this intuition. If trade union rights still have a negative impact on 
migration (index_TU), our index index_TU_4 which is a proxy of social tensions has the 
opposite effect. We find the same result when we use the Kucera index of trade union rights 
violations. The only difference is the positive sign is significant for primary educated workers 
when we use the Kucera index while it is significant for tertiary-educated workers when we 
use Index_TU_4. The sign and the significance of both coefficients are similar when these 
indexes are integrated conjointly in the specification.  
 
Trade union rights can be an effective tool to retain workers in their country. It is interesting 
to notice that this result is also confirmed for high-skilled workers. trade union rights may be 
a tool for countries fighting against brain drain. However, the existence of trade union rights 
is not a sufficient condition for retaining workers. If the development of trade union rights 
came together with a development of social tensions, it can have the opposite effects. 
Instability is a factor of emigration. Political instability may be a factor of emigration. It is 




In this paper, we show theoretically two channels of transmission from trade union rights to 
migration. The first one is an increased bargaining power for workers and more especially 
low-skilled workers. The second one is the existence of a wage premium in the formal sector 
that will benefit mainly to high-skilled workers. Empirically, we propose different measures 
of trade union rights. We find that these rights in origin countries have a negative impact on 
emigration rates, all things being equal, for low-skilled workers and high-skilled workers. 
Effects are not significant for secondary-educated workers. Both theoretical models are then 
validated by our estimates.  
 
However, we also put in evidence that trade union rights may have heterogeneous 
consequences. The development of such rights may increase the level of social dialogue but it 
may also increase the level of organized strikes and demonstrations. As it is the case for 
political instability, social disorders may be a factor of emigration. The second effect may 






































If the development of trade union rights may be seen as a political instrument for retaining 
workers in their home country, and particularly for avoiding brain drain, the government 
should also propose a framework favorable to the development of social dialogue and non-
confrontational collective bargaining mechanisms.  
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